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Abstract 
How do journalists working for state-funded international news organizations conceptualize 
and legitimize their relationship to the governments which support them? In what 
circumstances might such journalists seek to resist the diplomatic strategies of their funding 
states? To address these questions, we conducted a comparative study of journalists working 
for international news organizations funded by the Chinese, US, UK and Qatari governments. 
Using 52 interviews with journalists covering humanitarian issues, we explain how they 
minimized tensions between their diplomatic role and dominant norms of journalistic 
autonomy by drawing on three – broadly shared - legitimizing narratives.  
In the first ‘exclusionary’ narrative, journalists differentiated their ‘truthful’ news 
reporting from the ‘false’ state ‘propaganda’ of a common Other, the Russian-funded network, 
RT. In the second ‘fuzzifying’ narrative, journalists deployed the loose notion of ‘soft power’ 
as an ambivalent ‘boundary concept’ (Allen 2009; Star 2010), to defuse conflicts between 
journalistic and diplomatic agendas.  In the final ‘inversion’ narrative, journalists argued that, 
paradoxically, their dependence on funding states gave them greater ‘operational autonomy’ 
(Murdock 1983). While all three strategic narratives involved different forms of ‘boundary 
work’ (Gieryn 1983), unlike other kinds of ‘boundary work’, these narratives accommodated 
state interests and objectives. Even when journalists did resist their funding states, this tended 
to be hidden or partial. Journalists’ resistance also tended to be prompted less by concerns 
about ‘media imperialism’ than by severe threats to their personal cultural capital. Thus we 
suggest that if transnational news is a field, it is very weakly autonomous.  
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Introduction 
How do journalists working for state-funded transnational news organizations justify their 
relationships to the governments that finance them? When might they try to resist the 
diplomatic strategies of these governments, thus modifying the operation of state influence 
abroad? Are there any common patterns in journalists’ approach to state-media relations which 
cut across Western and non-Western news organizations? 
 
In this article, we explore these under-researched and important questions. In so doing, we 
illuminate how journalists imagine their relationships to funding states, as well as the limits of 
their willingness to cooperate with them.  Discussing these issues necessitates attending to 
multifaceted diplomatic struggles (Seib 2010), involving notions of state ‘propaganda’ (Bakir 
et al 2018: Freedman forthcoming) and ‘soft power’ (Nye 1991, 2004, 2008). However, it is 
very difficult to neatly divide coercive ‘propaganda’ from the non-coercive, persuasive 
communication commonly associated with ‘soft power’. Instead, a ‘grey’ spectrum seems to 
exist between the two, involving different kinds and degrees of selectivity, deception, 
incentivization and coercion (Bakir et al. 2018). 
 
Even Nye’s classic work (1991, 2004, 2008) makes a notoriously unclear distinction between 
‘soft power’ and ‘propaganda’. He stressed that governments should prevent state-funded 
media, like Voice of America, from being dismissed as ‘propaganda’ by taking steps to support 
journalists’ credibility: these include refraining from intervening in editorial matters, and 
allowing journalists to criticize the state (Nye 2008). But Nye also suggested that states may 
accrue ‘soft power’ by using international media to develop a sense of “shared values” across 
borders (2004:7). As Rawnsley has observed (2015), this description could easily apply to 
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Chinese and Russian approaches to international broadcasting, which are often regarded in the 
West as state propaganda. 
 
It may therefore be more useful to consider how ‘soft power’ and ‘propaganda’ are deployed 
strategically by different actors, including the journalists who work for state-funded 
transnational news organizations. These journalists  must engage in numerous position-taking 
strategies to negotiate their relationships to funding and host states, to dominant journalistic 
norms, to one another, news audiences and media markets,  in order to compete effectively for 
material and cultural capital  (Bourdieu 1998; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). These complex 
and different forms of positionality cannot be reduced to organizational differences. Indeed, 
the growth of freelancing in transnational news (Hellmueller and Konow-Lund 2019) means 
that some journalists frequently work for multiple outlets: thus adding another layer of 
complexity to previous research which highlighted flows of editorial staff (Kraidy 2007; Seib 
2012) between different kinds of news organizations.  
 
A nuanced relational approach is also required to assess the cumulative impact on transnational 
news of several significant shifts in state-media relations which took place during 2015-2018. 
During this period, the Chinese and American governments restructured their relationships to 
the transnational news organizations they fund, and the UK government discursively reframed 
its relationship to BBC World Service Radio. Although the Qatari government does not appear 
to have pursued either of these courses of action, its relationship to Al Jazeera has been 
seriously threatened by a major diplomatic crisis with its Gulf neighbors, which demanded that 
Qatar close the TV network down. 
 
4 
 
This article examines how state-funded journalists responded to these pressures using 52 semi-
structured interviews with staff and freelancers working for Al Jazeera English, BBC World 
Service, China Global Television Network (CGTN, previously known as CCTV), Voice of 
America and Xinhua. Using Bourdieusian field theory, we demonstrate that the ways in which 
journalists experienced and coped with such tensions were shaped by their particular position 
in the field. However, we also show that journalists tended to use similar kinds of legitimizing 
narratives, involving the strategic deployment of ‘soft power’ and ‘propaganda’. We then go 
on to interrogate the circumstances in which journalists ceased to find their previous 
legitimizing narratives convincing and explain why their resistance to funding states tended to 
be limited. Finally, we’ll conclude by discussing the theoretical implications of this study, 
including the extent to which transnational news is ‘fielded’. 
 
 
 Western transnational news 
 
Initially, it was hoped that ‘global’ satellite TV news, like CNN, would shape more progressive 
forms of cosmopolitan politics (Berglez 2008; Chouliaraki 2008; Volkmer 1999); breaking 
away from domination by domestic political elites (Bennett 1990; Entman 2003) and domestic 
news values (Galtung and Ruge 1965). Yet analyses of CNN’s output show that it tends to be 
uncritically supportive of US foreign policy (Thussu 2000). Other forms of commercially-
funded transnational journalism practiced in Belgium, France, and the UK have also been found 
to be powerfully shaped by the staff, cultural perspectives and political interests of news 
organizations’ states of origin (Christin 2016; Denĉik 2012, 2013; van Leuven and Berglez 
2016).  
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Yet journalists working for Western transnational news organizations have been portrayed as 
failing to critically reflect on their diplomatic function, even when they work for state-funded 
news organizations. For example, ethnographic research carried out at the BBC World Service 
(BBCWS) (Baumann et al. 2011), found that, despite the network’s origins in the BBC Empire 
Service, BBC producers did not seem to realize that their cultural and linguistic translation 
practices reproduced asymmetrically structured “diasporic contact zones” (Baumann, Gillespie 
and Sreberny 2011). The construction of such contact zones, the coauthors argued, indirectly 
served British interests, without disturbing the radio network’s “long established reputation for 
cosmopolitan openness, fairness and impartiality” (Gillespie and Baumann 2006: 1; see also 
Ogunyemi 2011).  
 
Yet the UK government’s framing of a new, generous funding package for BBCWS in terms 
of British strategic and defense interests (National Security Strategy and Defence and Security 
Review 2015) has prompted some journalists to engage in public, critical reflections about their 
diplomatic role. A former BBCWS managing editor, Burnett (2015) has criticized the UK 
government for breaking the unwritten code about the “soft power that dare not speak its 
name”, thereby endangering the BBC’s reputation for impartiality. By contrast, a presenter, 
Bennett-Jones (2018), has attacked the BBC’s senior managers for what he sees as their 
uncertainty about whether the BBCWS “exists to advance British soft power or to do 
journalism”. He challenges “stifling” managerial controls introduced after the Hutton Inquiry 
in 2003, including alleging that BBC managers refused to allow him to broadcast important 
details from a ministerial interview, following a conversation with Foreign Office officials. 
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Similarly, a series of legislative changes appears to have forced into the open journalists’ 
internal disagreements about the extent to which the Voice of America (VoA) radio network 
operates independently of the US administration (Bennet cited in Al Jazeera 2018; Robinson 
2017). As VoA has historically had a rather “incestuous” relationship with the US 
administration (Zelizer 2018: 12), but it has not broadcast domestically. A recent decision to 
revise the ‘anti-propaganda’ law from the Cold War period (Smith-Mundt Modernization Act 
of 2012) is controversial, as it would allow the network to do so (Hall 2017). Further legislation 
passed in 2016 removed the regulatory power of the bipartisan Broadcasting Board of 
Governors (BBG), which had provided a structural firewall between the US administration and 
state-funded international news organizations (Hall 2017). The ‘liberal press’ became seriously 
concerned about both changes following President Trump’s nomination of the new Head of the 
BBG: Michael Pack, a close associate of Steve Bannon, the former chief executive of the far-
right media outlet, Breitbart News (Gramer 2018; Mahdawi 2018). 
 
Like BBCWS, VoA has a legally binding Charter, which is supposed to protect it from political 
influence, along with the Hatch Act (1939), which restricts the political activity of federal 
employees.  However, unlike BBCWS, debates about VoA’s independence (or lack of it) have 
not been framed in terms of ‘soft power’. Instead, critics of President Trump have speculated 
about his potential wish to engage in state ‘propaganda’ (Al Jazeera 2018; Robinson 2017; 
Smith 2019), thus alluding once more to the policy discussions which took place in the Cold 
War era (Rawnsley 1996).   
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Transnational news funded by Qatar and China 
 
Discussions of journalists’ awareness of their involvement in diplomatic struggles, and their 
efforts to square this with dominant norms about journalistic autonomy (Hanitzsch et al. 2011), 
occur more often in research about the transnational news funded by China and Qatar. These 
forms of transnational news are not only portrayed as being involved in a multifaceted struggle 
for diplomatic influence around the globe (Seib 2010),  but also as being shaped by  the 
interactions of multiple local, national, regional and global factors, often producing complex 
forms of transcultural hybridity (Kraidy 2007). Thus, the transnational news funded by Qatar 
and China tends not to be portrayed as being wholly controlled by these authoritarian 
governments. 
 
Research into the private/state sponsored network, Al Jazeera, provides an excellent example 
of this. Maziad (2018) argues that in Egypt the interactions of Al Jazeera journalists with 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as interactions between journalists working on 
the network’s Arabic and English output, led to an Islamist takeover of selected channels. 
Although Qatar had previously supported the Muslim Brotherhood, she says that this situation 
does not appear to have been engineered by Qatari officials and was not in the country’s 
strategic interests (Maziad 2018). Indeed, Qatar’s enemies were able to claim that Al Jazeera 
was nothing more than a vehicle for Qatari ‘propaganda’ (Qatar Crisis News 2017), thereby 
providing the final trigger for the Gulf diplomatic crisis, which commenced in 2017 
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Previously, Al Jazeera had enhanced Qatar’s international status by forging pan-Arab and other 
solidarities (Cherkaoui 2014; Seib 2012). This was enabled by the network’s journalistic 
credibility, which was achieved through its adoption of dominant journalistic norms, including 
objectivity and balance. This approach was shaped by the network’s recruitment of Western-
trained journalists from the failed BBC-Saudi enterprise, BBC Arabic (Seib 2012). However, 
Qatar’s deteriorating relations with Saudi Arabia, following the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011, appears 
to have shaped strong correspondences between Qatar’s foreign policies and the output of Al 
Jazeera Arabic during crises (Cherkaoui 2014; Al Nahed 2015; Samuel-Azran 2013). Although 
increased managerial pressure to endorse Qatari policy was rejected by some journalists at Al 
Jazeera Arabic, several of whom resigned in protest (Samuel-Azran 2013). 
 
The output of Al Jazeera English corresponds less clearly to Qatari foreign policy (Al Nahed 
2015; Samuel-Azran 2013), retaining its credibility with Western audiences by positioning 
itself as a liberal, pro-democratic ‘voice of the voiceless’. However, earlier claims that an 
empowering ‘Al Jazeera effect’ would reduce government and mainstream media monopoly 
on information (Seib 2011) seem to have been somewhat overstated. This is because the 
station’s elite sourcing practices (Figenschou 2010) and adoption of Western frames (Bebawi 
2016), mean that its output tends to be characterized by a mixture of sameness and difference, 
rather than radical alterity. 
 
Chinese transnational media are less obviously cultural hybrids (Kraidy 2007). They generally 
serve Chinese diplomatic interests by framing China as promoting global order and harmony, 
or as an equal partner in mutually beneficial exchanges with other non-Western governments 
(Madrid-Morales 2017; Marsh 2017). The former premier, Hu Jintao, saw these representations 
as helping to counter negative, Western news narratives about China, thereby building 
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particular kinds of ‘soft power’ (Boyd-Barrett 2015; Zhang et al. 2016). However, the extent 
to which these kinds of transnational news correspond to China’s foreign policy seems to vary 
according to media organizations, topics and locales concerned.  
 
An especially rich body of research explores the practices and perspectives of journalists 
working for Chinese transnational news in the strategically important region of Africa (e.g. 
Wasserman 2015; Zhang et al. 2016). African journalists are often acutely aware of Chinese 
managers’ domination within story selection, framing and approvals processes (Umejei 2016). 
However, even Xinhua, which is one of the most tightly controlled outlets, changed its 
journalism to conform with dominant Western news values: introducing greater ‘timeliness’ to 
improve the uptake of its content by other transnational media, as well as domestic African 
outlets (Xin 2008, 2012).  
 
African journalists working for the TV network, CCTV (now CGTN) seem able to exercise 
greater editorial freedom than those at Xinhua, although they still self-censor, particularly in 
relation to ‘controversial’ political topics (Madrid-Morales 2017; Marsh 2016; Umejei 2017). 
The network’s focus on solutions-oriented ‘constructive’ approaches (Marsh 2016), and efforts 
to represent both China and Africa in a positive, uncritical light (Gagliardone 2013) mean that 
its journalists struggle to gain credibility within more media-literate African countries, like 
Kenya and South Africa (Maweu 2016; Wasserman and Madrid-Morales 2018). Journalists’ 
concern about this issue (Gagliardone 2013) is likely to have been exacerbated by the approach 
taken by the current President, Xi Jinping, who has stressed the need for journalists to exhibit 
absolute loyalty to the party (Repnikova 2017), and restructured all international broadcasters 
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under a single umbrella, tasked with “spreading the party’s guiding principles and policies” 
(CGTN 21 March 2018). 
 
 
This study 
 
We analyze how journalists working for state-funded transnational news outlets coped with the 
changes which took place between 2015-2018. Specifically, we ask: 
RQ 1: How did these journalists conceptualize and legitimize their relationships to the 
governments that finance them? 
RQ2: In what circumstances did journalists try to resist the diplomatic strategies of their 
funding governments? 
 
Our analytical framework was influenced by managerial research which demonstrates that 
workers construct legitimizing self-narratives to deal with the instability involved in 
organizational transitions (Ibarra and Barbulesc 2010), and/or to negotiate the tensions 
involved in hybrid roles (Sveningsson and Alvesson 2003). We have also been influenced by 
sociological research into the ‘boundary work’ conducted by professionals to manage the 
division between their own occupational field and that of others (Gieryn 1983). This includes 
the ways in which professionals use fuzzy, multivalent ‘boundary concepts’ to sustain 
cooperation with those in other fields (Allen 2009; Star 2010), and how they demarcate distinct 
boundaries between different fields of activity (Gieryn 1983). In particular, we draw from a 
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rich vein of research into how journalists articulate “who counts as a journalist, what counts as 
journalism and what is appropriate journalistic behavior, and what is deviant” (Carlson 
2015:2).  This includes our own previous work in which we used Bourdieusian field theory 
(Bourdieu 1998; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) to illuminate how other kinds of funders— 
private foundations—changed journalists’ perceptions of appropriate forms of journalistic 
work and output. (Scott, Bunce and Wright 2018a).  
 
In this article, we analyze how state-funded transnational news journalists used legitimizing 
narratives to accommodate changes in state-media relations, and cope with related tensions 
pertaining to their professional autonomy.  In so doing, we address broader questions about the 
extent to which transnational news constitutes a distinctive field, involving shared ‘rules of the 
game’ (doxa) and struggles over common stakes (capital) (Christin 2016). To discuss these 
issues, we draw from a broader, mixed methods study about reporting on humanitarian issues 
(Scott, Bunce and Wright 2018b), which found that the majority of regular, original coverage 
in the English language was provided by state-funded transnational news organizations. These 
organizations were the wire agency, Xinhua, and the broadcasters, Al Jazeera English (AJE), 
BBC World Service Radio (BBCWS), CGTN (formerly CCTV News), and Voice of America 
(VoA).  
 
The data analyzed here is derived from 52 semi-structured interviews with 47 state-funded 
journalists employed by these organizations, who were active in humanitarian reporting. 
(Shorter follow-up interviews were sometimes necessary to check whether planned actions had 
taken place). Data from 8 interviews with other journalists who worked for commercial news 
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organizations, including Thomson Reuters and Associated Press news wires and CNN, were 
included to add context.  
 
These interviews were conducted by the co-authors during 2017-18. They lasted 1-2 hours each 
and took place in the major hubs of transnational news production, Bangkok, London, Nairobi, 
New York and Washington. Skype interviews were used when security or confidentiality issues 
prevented meeting in person. Participants were sampled on the grounds of content analysis or 
colleague referral. Although just over half were born and raised in Western countries, 
journalists often discussed more complex identities, including dual ethnic/cultural heritage 
and/or formative experiences of living in non-Western countries as a young adult.  
 
Sample Data: 
 
Table 1: Job title: 
Producer Reporter Correspondent Editor (regional, 
output, or media- 
specific, e.g. online) 
Manager (bureau 
chief up to senior 
executive) 
Other 
8 6 8 11 10 4 
 
 
Table 2:  Working for: 
AJE BBCWS CGTN VoA Xinhua Several state-funded 
organizations  
11 11 10 4 5 6  
 
 
Table 3: Name identified as: 
Man Woman 
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34 13 
 
Table 4: Location: 
UK/Europe North America Australasia Africa Middle East Asia Latin America 
7 8 0 18 6 8 0 (2 covered, but 
based elsewhere) 
 
Table 5: Born/raised in: 
Continent No. of participants Countries 
Asia 6 China (4), India (1), Taiwan (1) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 14 Kenya (9) Rwanda (1), South Africa 
(3), Zimbabwe (1) 
Australasia 1 New Zealand (1) 
Latin America 1 Ecuador (1) 
Middle East 3 Egypt (1), Israel (1), Yemen (1) 
UK/Europe 17 UK (15), Denmark (1), Germany (1) 
USA  4  
 
The topic of state-media relations was raised spontaneously by journalists when asked about 
the resources available to them, as well as the practices, relationships, constraints and 
opportunities shaping their practice. The terms ‘soft power’ and ‘propaganda’ were introduced 
by study participants, not researchers. Transcripts were coded using NVIVO and analyzed 
thematically. Data analysis was conducted by the lead author to ensure consistency, and regular 
team meetings were held to discuss emerging themes. Due to the sensitive nature of these 
interviews, we have removed participants’ names, as well as interview dates. 
 
Legitimizing narratives: Propaganda and soft power 
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The changes in state-media relations which took place during 2015-2018 exerted an external 
‘shock’, which made it more difficult for journalists to avoid reflecting on the role of 
transnational news in international diplomacy. Commercial news journalists, particularly those 
at CNN, were acutely aware of the greater material capital available to their state-funded peers. 
They frequently mentioned colleagues who had previously moved to AJE for its greater 
resources, and many were keen to move to BBCWS because of its new, generous state funding. 
 
However, those working for state-funded news outlets tended to find their relationship to 
funding governments more troublesome. Journalists employed by CGTN and Xinhua reported 
increased managerial censorship, which had previously been quite rare (Madrid-Morales 2017; 
Marsh 2017; Umejei 2016). Those at AJE spoke of the travel restrictions caused by the Gulf 
blockade of Qatar (Maziad 2018), which limited their ability to report on the war in Yemen, as 
well as triggering increased bureaucratic obstacles and legal threats by other countries opposed 
to Qatar. Journalists working for AJE, VoA and BBCWS all decried the ways in which funding 
governments controlled their budget, as well as exercising power over organizational strategy.   
 
These tensions were not uniformly distributed but were experienced differently by journalists 
according to different kind of positionality.  Journalists’ geographic positioning was an 
especially important factor, shaping specific legislative/regulatory environments, local labor 
pools and forms of industry competition, as well as distinct kinds of sociopolitical sensitivities 
(Youmans 2017:81). Regarding the latter, a seismic analogy may be used, as the external 
‘shocks’ exerted by changes in state-media relations tended to be felt most acutely by 
journalists covering events in geographic locales where the interventions of their funding 
governments were already hotly contested. Such countries included Egypt, Kenya, Myanmar, 
Sudan and South Sudan, as well as Syria and Yemen. But journalists’ efforts to cope with these 
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external ‘shocks’ were also shaped by other kinds of positioning, including their seniority, 
employment security and cultural background.  
 
Broadly speaking, journalists sought to reassure themselves (and others) by utilizing three 
legitimizing narratives, involving inter-related kinds of ‘boundary-work’ (Gieryn 1983). These 
legitimizing narratives cut across organizational boundaries, including those between news 
outlets funded by democratic and authoritarian states. The first narrative, which was commonly 
used by all kinds of journalists, involved them justifying their work by differentiating it from 
state ‘propaganda’. Journalists defined ‘propaganda’ narrowly, as involving the deliberate 
dissemination of falsehood. This narrow definition had an instrumental use: allowing 
participants to position themselves as journalists, rather than state propagandists, because of 
their commitment to truth-telling. As one top executive at AJE put it, reporters at the channel 
were committed to “searching for truth in the ocean of lies” created by powerful regimes and 
self-serving elites in the region. Likewise, regional editors at VoA stressed that their output 
was not propaganda because they didn’t publish “fake news” or “bullshit”, and BBCWS 
reporters and producers all stressed that they disseminated “accurate news” not “propaganda”.  
 
This legitimating narrative involved classic forms of exclusionary boundary-work, in which 
specific actors and practices were symbolically expelled as ‘non-journalistic’ (Carlson and 
Lewis 2015). Journalists’ definition of ‘propaganda’ solely in terms of falsehood enabled them 
to avoid reflecting upon the potential existence of “propaganda with facts” (Nicholas Pronay 
quoted in Rawnsley 1996:10), including state officials’ indirect influence over journalists’ 
selection and framing of events (Bakir et al. 2018; Bennett 1990; Entman 2003).  
Journalists further justified their own work by excluding a commonly recognized ‘Other’. This 
was RT, the cable TV network, funded by the Russian government, which was widely regarded 
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by participants as producing untrue “propaganda” and “not news” (Yablokov 2015).  Indeed, 
even CGTN staff regarded RT as so lacking in journalistic credibility that one producer called 
it a “joke of a network”. Yet the same participants had previously expressed serious concerns 
about increased managerial pressure to promote ‘positive’ stories about China and Chinese 
allies (discussed in Gagliardone 2013), as well as increased managerial censorship (discussed 
in Madrid-Morales 2017; Marsh 2017). For instance, one CGTN editor said that they had been 
repeatedly told to remove online stories which attracted negative audience comments about 
China. Another said they were worried that President Xi’s more centralized, directive policies 
might be gradually pushing CGTN journalists “towards the point of propaganda”. 
 
The second legitimizing narrative was less widespread, as it was only used by the most senior 
staff at Al-Jazeera and BBCWS. It involved journalists deploying the loose, ambiguous concept 
of ‘soft power’ (Nye 1991, 2004, 2008) to gloss over potential conflicts between the priorities 
and values of journalists and politicians. Some of these senior journalists were top executives 
who had been personally involved in funding negotiations with government officials. But 
others were close to such negotiators because of their formal rank, longstanding organizational 
service, and/or accumulation of cultural and social capital. These senior actors used ‘soft 
power’ as a kind of loose, multivalent ‘boundary concept’ (Allen 2009; Star 2010) to sustain 
ongoing co-operation with funding states, by making it appear that neither journalists nor 
diplomats needed to compromise their identities, values  or objectives to satisfy the other. 
 
News executives tended to use this ‘soft power’ narrative to deflect criticism by others. When 
they defined ‘soft power’ at all, they defined it very simply, in terms of states’ accumulation 
of international prestige. For example, a senior managing editor at AJE explained that Western 
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audiences at public talks sometimes challenged him by asking what the Qatari government “got 
out of” funding the network. He responded by saying, 
I point to this concept of ‘soft power’ and I say, “It’s the same reason why countries want to host the 
World Cup, or host the Olympics, or fund football teams. It’s about prestige in the world, reputation, 
giving a country some standing. 
Thus, the executive diverted attention away from difficult questions about the extent to which 
Al Jazeera’s output maps onto Qatar’s foreign policy (Samuel-Azran 2013), as well as avoiding  
any consideration of the political effects of enabling an authoritarian state like Qatar to be 
associated with a network branded as the progressive ‘voice of the voiceless’ (Figenshou 2010).  
 
Fuzzy notions of ‘soft power’ were also used by other kinds of high-ranking journalists to gloss 
over their own concerns about threats to their political impartiality. One senior figure began 
this discussion with a troubling reflection, saying that: 
I mean Caversham [the BBC Media Monitoring Service] was a spy agency, which we made the use of, 
and still do.  I am sure the intelligence services like to get all these [reports] on their desk every morning, 
as I do in my inbox.  That is the why you get the money, isn’t it?  
 
However, this participant rapidly reassured himself about the legitimacy of his journalism by 
deploying the notion of ‘soft power’ in ways which portrayed journalists’ and British 
diplomats’ interests as overlapping in odd—but roughly compatible— ways. As he put it, 
I mean, what is the point of BBC language services? What is the justification now for taxpayers to pay 
for them? … It is soft power. That is the reason these services are being set up.  That is why we are trying 
to broadcast into Ethiopia, into Eritrea, into North Korea, or expanding in areas which were traditionally 
British colonies…. 
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[For the BBC] it’s about growing audiences...Where do you go for that? You go for places where there 
is an appetite for what we are giving and what we are giving is fair, accurate, balanced news that you 
don’t get from more dictatorial regimes.  
So I guess [what the BBC World Service does] does go hand-in-hand with what the [British] government 
wants in terms of ‘soft power’, but it’s also what the BBC wants in terms of growing its audiences, and 
providing a service to people who can’t get that balanced [news] service in another way. 
The conceptual ‘fuzziness’ of ‘soft power’ allowed this journalist to portray the objectives of 
journalists and politicians as having equal weight within a mutually beneficial relationship. 
Thus, the journalist’s strategic deployment of ‘soft power’ enabled him to avoid dwelling on 
two profoundly problematic issues: the impossibility of separating ‘soft’ power from ‘hard’ 
coercive power, and the co-structuring of the BBCWS in relation to state security and 
intelligence systems  (Rawnsley 1996, 2016). 
 
 
Legitimizing narratives: Operational and allocative autonomy  
 
The first two legitimizing narratives tended to be underpinned by the way in which journalists 
reframed their ‘independence’ in terms of the operational autonomy they were exercised in 
their day-to-day work (Murdock 1983). In this way, they minimized (their own and others’) 
concerns about their lack of allocative autonomy over the distribution of resources, and related 
organizational strategies (Murdock 1983). Some of these participants were senior staff, who 
were nationals of the state funding their news organization. For example, American managers 
at VoA were deeply worried about anticipated budget cuts, as well as the erosion of the 
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organizational firewalls between the US administration and state-funded international 
broadcasters, in the context of the Trump administration. As one put it, 
We all saw what happened during the campaign and the various different attacks on the media that the 
president, as a candidate, was waging.  
There was a concern amongst journalists …that there would be some sort of real focus on how VoA can 
reach audiences around the world, and a look at, perhaps, how the White House can take advantage of 
that. 
 
These journalists also reflected on profound tensions within VoA’s Charter, which obliged 
them to offer accurate, objective and comprehensive news whilst also, as one editor put it, 
report “through the prism of United States’ government policy” (discussed in Rawnsley 1996). 
Yet journalists minimized their concern over such issues by emphasizing their ability to engage 
in editorial decision-making free of overt “interference” from government officials. As an 
American editor at VOA stressed, 
We don’t get pressure to take a certain line, to stick to the US government agenda. I have been running 
X desk at central news [for 15 years], and I can’t think of a time when somebody has said “You need to 
cover this, or you need not to cover this. This is very important for such-and-such a senator or [a specific 
US agency]”. It has been left to my judgement. 
 
 None of the journalists at VoA reflected upon the potential ideological implications of the 
station’s appointment of a right-wing anchor from Fox News, whose presence resulted in rare 
interviews with some of the US administration’s most notable ‘hawks’, including the National 
Security Advisor, John Bolton and the Vice President, Mike Pence, and even the President 
himself.  When directly asked, a senior manager simply stated that it was “very nice to get 
some top-level people being interviewed on a consistent basis”. 
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Journalists who were not nationals of their funding state also legitimized their work by stressing 
their operational autonomy. Many of these participants were employed by AJE and BBCWS. 
But intriguingly, even journalists at Xinhua —who experienced the most regular and explicit 
censorship—justified their work by stressing their ability to engage in some forms of day-to-
day editorial independence.  They used this approach to refute allegations made by diplomats 
from other countries that they were ‘propagandists’: arguing that they were personally 
committed to ‘independent’ forms of journalistic work, and it was not their fault if their 
managers forced them to modify stories in accordance with Chinese policy (discussed in 
Umejei 2016). For example, one reporter stressed the journalistic “investigations” they carried 
out on NGO field trips, without the knowledge of his Chinese managers. An editor spoke 
proudly of the way in which he smuggled stories on human rights reports past the censors by 
leading with government rebuttals. A third correspondent, who was a freelancer, explained that 
they wrote for Xinhua most of the time because it paid better. But they pitched their more 
“controversial” investigative stories to Al Jazeera.  
 
Clearly, these forms of operational autonomy were limited and individualized, but they had 
great symbolic importance for local Xinhua journalists: enabling them to claim that they were 
‘real’ journalists, rather than the mouthpieces of the Chinese state. Other position-taking 
strategies designed to maximize journalists’ autonomy were found at CGTN. For example, 
some local staff and freelancers maximized their editorial discretion by waiting to pitch stories 
until late in their shift when differences in time zones meant that their line management 
switched from Beijing to the more lenient team in Washington. Other journalists engaged in 
longer-term strategies, such as opting to work on documentaries, where they could benefit from 
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CGTN’s generous resources, but escape what they said was the stricter editorial oversight 
involved in news output.  
 
In addition, journalists’ focus on their operational autonomy was important because it tended 
to be shaped by a third legitimating narrative, which appeared to be the most common of all. 
At the heart of this narrative was a form of ‘boundary work’ which differed to those discussed 
in previous scholarship, as it didn’t involve constructing a symbolic boundary between 
occupational fields (Carlson and Lewis 2015) or fuzzifying boundaries using multivalent 
‘boundary concepts’ (Allen 2009; Star 2010). Instead, this legitimizing narrative inverted 
journalists’ concerns about their lack of autonomy: suggesting that dependence on their funding 
state was, paradoxically, a powerful source of journalists’ operational autonomy.  
 
Staff at AJE and CGTN discussed how warm diplomatic relations with their funding state 
enabled them to gain access to warzones and other hostile areas, which other journalists were 
unable to reach. Their counterparts at BBC WS and VoA said that state resources enabled them 
to pursue less popular or more time-consuming stories, including those involving extensive 
travel to non-elite countries and rural areas. This, they explained, gave them far greater 
“freedom” than colleagues at commercial news organizations, who were constrained by 
audience ratings, and the need to generate advertising revenue.  
 
In a sense, this finding is unsurprising: state funding is often seen as providing journalists with 
some kinds of greater freedom. But such issues are usually discussed in relation to the 
principles of deliberative democracy, public service and the need to protect news organizations 
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from political influence (e.g. Benson and Powers 2011). What was interesting here was not 
only that journalists consciously weighed one kind of autonomy against another, but also that 
even those who were funded by authoritarian states justified their work in these terms.  
 
 
Practical boundary-work: Resisting funding governments 
 
Although these three narratives were commonly used by journalists to justify their production  
of state-funded transnational news, there were times when some began to question their 
relationship to their funding state more rigorously. These journalists sometimes engaged in 
other forms of ‘boundary-work’ (Gieryn 1983) which challenged or moderated the diplomatic 
influence of their funding state. A key focus of this research was the Kenyan capital of Nairobi, 
which is the main production ‘hub’ of transnational news about Africa.  Nairobi’s positioning 
as a kind of ‘port of entry’ for such organizations (Youmans 2017) not only shaped the nature 
of journalistic labor, industry competition, and socio-political tensions, but is also re/shaping 
the built environment of the city. For example, during fieldwork the Chinese government was 
building an impressive 16 story international news center, at the same time as the BBCWS was 
using funding from the UK government to turn its Nairobi office into its largest international 
bureau (BBC 2018). 
 
Journalists claimed that what caused them to re-evaluate their previous legitimizing rationales 
was not this material manifestation of foreign powers’ struggle for influence within Africa 
(discussed in Wasserman 2015; Zhang et al. 2016). Instead, they were more concerned about 
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the unequal distribution of material capital within their news organizations. At CGTN and 
BBCWS, Kenyan staff were paid far less than international staff. Since most ‘international’ 
staff were either Chinese (at CGTN) or British (at BBCWS), many Kenyan journalists and their 
colleagues from other sub-Saharan countries, viewed this disparity in pay as evidence of an 
imperialistic mindset (discussed jn Boyd-Barrett 2015; Umejei 2016).  
 
African journalists’ concerns about Kenyans’ lower rates of pay were exacerbated by their 
frustrations about what they saw as their limited ability to compete for other ‘stakes in the 
game’: namely, their personal career prospects. CGTN staff said that it wasn’t possible for 
them to be promoted: once appointed to a job, that was where they stayed, unless they left the 
organization. Meanwhile, BBC journalists said they despaired of the way in which newly 
recruited Kenyan staff (funded by the recent windfall from the UK government), were 
appointed even further down the pay-scale than existing local staff.  In addition, African staff 
employed by the BBCWS and CGTN argued that bureau chiefs were almost always nationals 
of funding governments, so journalists ‘like them’ would never rise that far up the career ladder.  
  
Such grievances were exacerbated at the BBCWS by the extra financial allowances given to 
the Corporation’s international staff for housing, healthcare and schooling. But CGTN staff 
were more concerned about their unequal access to other kinds of material capital. Several 
African journalists alleged that they were not allowed to use the staff minibus to travel home 
until after Chinese managers had completed their own journeys: a situation which these 
journalists experienced as being so discriminatory that one reporter even said it felt like 
“apartheid”.  
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African journalists’ concerns about unequal access to material capital within their organizations 
appeared to give greater force to the niggling qualms which some said they had previously felt 
about their diplomatic role. Some African staff at CGTN explicitly re-examined their 
complicity in legitimizing the rapid expansion of Chinese presence within the continent. 
Kenyan staff and freelancers who worked for the BBC  also voiced discomfort about their role 
in promoting an attractive vision of British culture (Nye 1991, 2004, 2008), which created what 
one producer called a kind of “warm fuzziness” towards the UK, and a  questionable “trust” in 
“all things British” amongst older generations in East Africa. 
 
This combination of normative and self-interested concerns prompted three African journalists 
to leave their jobs at state-funded news organizations, a fourth withdrew from a regular and 
longstanding freelancing arrangement. Several other journalists in this study were considering 
following suit. Thus, it initially appeared that local journalists’ unequal access to material 
capital could be as significant a cause of resignation amongst state-funded journalists as 
increased managerial intervention in editorial decision-making (Samuel-Azran 2013). 
However, a year after the study was completed, only one participant had stopped working for 
state-funded transnational news organizations altogether, by making a complete career change. 
The others had since moved (or were seeking to move) to new positions at other state-funded 
transnational media organizations. These journalists argued that they had little alternative, as 
work for domestic media in Kenya involved working much longer hours for less money, and 
frequently involved greater government intimidation and censorship (Wadekar 2018). 
Moreover, we found little evidence of journalists uniting to resist the diplomatic strategies of 
funding states, either in terms of formal, unionized action, or in terms of informal group 
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collaboration. The exception to this was one occasion, in 2017, when Chinese managers at 
CGTN Nairobi introduced a rule that every program had to begin with some ‘positive’ African 
news, in accordance with Chinese diplomatic directives. This policy was later retracted because 
of the collective resistance of African staff, including senior editors and correspondents, as well 
as their more junior colleagues. African journalists’ opposition to the policy was grounded in 
their commitment to doxic practices relating to newsworthiness. As one editor put it,  
We had weird stories taking the top slot just to stay positive.  But you realize it can’t work because you 
can’t talk about, for example, a flower farm or something, but there is an explosion that has killed dozens 
of people, and everybody is talking about that 
 
However, as in Gagliardone’s study (2013), this journalist was less concerned about the 
prospect of losing credibility with news audiences, than with losing cultural capital in the eyes 
of other journalists. Indeed, a key factor in African journalists’ decision to resist this diplomatic 
strategy was their conviction that being seen to prioritize Chinese interests over dominant 
journalistic values would make it impossible for them to secure positions at other transnational 
news organizations in future. Nevertheless, CGTN journalists were acutely aware that they 
benefited from far greater job security and better pay than their colleagues working for 
domestic media in Kenya. This seems likely to have shaped their decision to avoid a heated 
confrontation with their Chinese managers. Instead, they took a more conciliatory approach, 
offering a compromise which involved “look[ing] for the positive”, even in very negative 
stories.  As one of the editors explained, 
[We said to our Chinese managers] How about let’s be realistic?  At the same time, even as you are 
covering the conflicts, the violence, if you see any positive aspect, you can bring it into the story… 
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… [For example] just going even to a refugee camp and just seeing children smiling, trying to be 
children in the midst of that calamity and difficulty, children trying to learn even under a tree; that 
desire for education…You kind of show the positive aspects. So, it’s all in the mix. 
 
Therefore, collective resistance to funding states seems rare, even amongst journalists with 
relatively secure staff contracts. When such resistance occurred it was partial, involving 
African staff negotiating a mutually acceptable compromise with senior managers. We did not 
find any occasion when journalists united to defend a distinct border between the journalistic 
and political fields. Indeed, it is illuminating to compare the negotiating strategy employed by 
these African journalists with the instrumental use of ‘soft power’ by the most senior journalists 
at AJE and BBCWS. Although the power dynamics clearly differed, both sets of actors defused 
conflict by creating the appearance of a fuzzy, ambivalent overlap between the journalistic and 
political fields, which could benefit both sides. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, we analyze the legitimizing narratives which state-funded transnational news 
journalists used to resolve tensions between their diplomatic role and dominant journalistic 
norms, especially notions of autonomy. Despite important differences in their positioning, we 
found that these journalists tended to utilize three key legitimizing narratives, which 
re/negotiated the symbolic boundary between the journalistic and the political field (Bourdieu 
1998; Carlson and Lewis 2015; Gieryn 1983). These narratives cut across divides between 
news organizations, including those funded by authoritarian and democratic governments. 
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The first exclusionary narrative, used by all kinds of journalists, involved justifying their work 
by differentiating their ‘truthful’ reporting from the false ‘propaganda’ disseminated by 
symbolic Others, especially the Russian cable network RT (Yablokov 2015). The second 
‘fuzzifying’ narrative was only used by the most senior journalists at AJE and BBCWS. These 
participants used ‘soft power’ (Nye 1991, 2004, 2008) as a loose, ambivalent ‘boundary 
concept’ (Allen 2009; Star 2010) to make it appear that the journalistic and political fields 
could overlap in mutually beneficial ways,  without either journalists or funding governments 
having to abandon their identities, values or objectives. Both of these narratives tended to rely 
on a third inverted narrative, which involved journalists arguing that, paradoxically, their 
dependence on funding states served as a powerful source of operational autonomy (Murdock 
1983): enabling them to pursue time-consuming and expensive stories about the suffering of 
marginalized groups in remote or hostile areas. 
 
These findings contribute to media sociology by showing that there are different forms of 
journalistic ‘boundary-work’ in operation within transnational news, which involve journalists 
accommodating changes in state-media relations, rather than resisting state interests and 
directives.  Journalists are often prepared to consciously ‘trade off’ different forms of autonomy 
against one another, compromising on one to gain greater advantages in another. We also help 
develop political communication theory by showing that although ‘soft power’ and 
‘propaganda’ are often criticized for being multivalent critical terms, this is precisely why they 
are of such strategic importance in the legitimizing narratives of state-funded journalists. By 
deploying deliberately narrow definitions of ‘propaganda’ as well as the conceptual ‘fuzziness’ 
of ‘soft power’, journalists were able to sidestep more complex and troubling questions about 
the relationship of their work to the operation of state security and intelligence: so continuing 
to justify their employment by state-funded news organizations to themselves and others. 
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Indeed, what is perhaps most important about the ‘boundary-work’ discussed in this study is 
how rarely it prompted journalists to resist the diplomatic strategies of their funding state. Local 
journalists critically re-examined their legitimizing narratives when angered by their unequal 
access to material capital within their news organizations, in terms of pay, promotion and job-
related perks. Then, these journalists began to wonder if they might be serving the imperialistic 
strategies of funding states, rather than working as ‘independent’ journalists (Boyd-Barrett 
2015). However, the lack of better career options within domestic media meant that even the 
most cynical tended to go on to apply to other state-funded transnational news organizations. 
Indeed, the only occasion when journalists collectively resisted the diplomatic strategies of 
their funding government was when they feared that failing to do so would damage their 
cultural capital so badly in the eyes of other journalists that they would be unable to secure 
positions at other transnational news outlets. 
 
These findings have implications for broader arguments about the extent to which transnational 
news is ‘fielded’. Our research supports the findings of others who have pointed to the ongoing 
dominance of domestic perspectives and personnel (Christin 2016; Denĉik 2012, 2013; 
Ogunyemi 2014; van Leuven and Berglez 2016). The doxic practices of transnational news 
journalists also involved the news value of negativity, which also shapes the production of 
foreign news in domestic media (Galtung and Ruge 1965). In addition, African journalists’ 
concern about the paucity of opportunities available to them in the domestic job market was 
clearly a crucial factor in their decision-making. Together, these findings seem to suggest that 
transnational new journalists occupy the same journalistic field as their domestic colleagues, 
rather than belonging to a distinct field of their own.  
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However, the structuring of the job market meant that the ‘stakes of the game’ which mattered 
most to these journalists was their cultural capital in the eyes of those employed by other 
transnational news organizations. Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of this study was the 
frequent circulation of staff and freelance journalists between state-funded transnational news 
outlets (Hellmueller and Konow-Lund 2019), including those supported by authoritarian and 
democratic governments. This mobility appears to have enabled the diffusion of certain ways 
of legitimizing media-state relations within state-funded transnational news.   
 
In addition, journalists’ boundary-work in the first two legitimizing narratives hinged upon 
concepts like ‘propaganda’ and ‘soft power’ which are specific to the boundary with 
international diplomacy, rather to politics in general, or PR. Likewise, the third legitimizing 
narrative, which stressed the importance of journalists’ operational autonomy, depended upon 
journalists’ sense of normative obligation to cover the suffering of distant others, in ways which 
don’t seem to be fully explained by domestic news values (Chouliaraki 2008).  For these 
reasons, we think that it is worth exploring whether transnational news may be (very) weakly 
fielded using a more generalized sample of journalists.  
 
Nevertheless, it was important to research how the transnational news journalists who cover 
humanitarian issues understand their relationships to funding governments, as this analysis 
helps to explain why these kinds of transnational news may be particularly vulnerable to 
domination by states’ diplomatic interests. This finding is significant because of the 
multivalence of ‘humanitarianism’ itself, discourse about which is used as a “political 
resource” by state and non-state actors to legitimize many different kinds of intervention 
(Fassin 2010:239). 
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